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Abstract 
 
We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than those 
driving similar results in the search and matching literature. A marriage is a joint venture where husband and 
wife contribute to the couple’s welfare by allocating their time to portfolios of risky activities. Men and 
women are characterised by different preferences over risk and the optimal match is between partners with 
the same level of risk aversion. In our model no two men (women) rank the same woman (men) as most de-
sirable. Given that there is no unanimous ranking of candidates, everyone marries in equilibrium their most 
preferred partner. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The view of marriage we have in economics since 
Becker’s contribution [1] is rather grim.1 Becker ex-
plained the common observation that like marries with 
like on the basis of a matching model where assortative 
pairing results as an equilibrium outcome. The model 
builds on a heterogeneous population of males and fe-
males whose distinctive characteristic, say beauty, can be 
ranked in terms of desirability to the partner in an objec-
tive way.2 A common ordering of types guarantees that 
all the boys agree that females are ranked in desirability 
from the most plain of women all the way to, say, Ange-
lina Jolie. Similarly all girls agree that males can be or-
dered from the world’s worst looking man to, obviously, 
Brad Pitt. Pairing occurs through search. Boys and girls 
look for their best match. All boys would love to marry 
Angelina Jolie and all girls would love to marry Brad Pitt. 
However matches have to be agreed by both parties in-
volved and Angelina Jolie certainly would not settle for 
anything less than Brad Pitt. Now, if Brad takes Angelina 
(as it happens), the best match for the second boy down 
the line is the girl that falls one rank short to Angelina. 
And so forth. The result is that we are all matched with 
the best partner we are able to reach, and this is someone 
who is equally ranked to us in beauty. Like marries with 
like, as in the common wisdom. 
Now, for those of us who are not Angelina Jolie this 
provides a rather grim view of marriage. When we ex-
press our vows we like to think that we are marrying the 
only one we would ever consider to marry, the best man 
in the world. By contrast, Becker’s view is that we are 
actually marrying the only one we could get! 
In this note we propose a happier view of marriage, 
where matching results out of elective affinities. We 
think of marriage as a joint venture: in their married life, 
husband and wife commit to share any outcome resulting 
from the risky choices they make. Hence what may or 
may not make a potential partner desirable is his or her 
attitude towards risk. In a population of males and fe-
males who are heterogeneous in risk preferences, we 
derive assortative matching as an equilibrium outcome 
where like marries with like. Unlike in Becker’s story, 
here all men and women manage to marry the best part-
ner they could ever dream for themselves because there 
is an Angelina Jolie and a Brad Pitt for everyone. 
Although these two alternative views of marriage end 
up with the same matching outcome, we believe that we 
are proposing a much happier view of marriage, with no 
regrets. 
1For more recent reviews, see Becker [2], Bergstrom [3], Weiss [4], 
Browning Chiappori and Weiss [5]. 
2Of course beauty is only one of the possible desirable characteristics of 
a man or a woman. We take beauty here just for the sake of an example.
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2. The Model 
 
Men and Women are endowed with one unit of time 
which they must allocate to a portfolio of risky activities. 
To make the analysis simple, we assume that there are 
only two types of activities: a risky activity which returns 
a payoff r > 1 with probability p and zero with probabil- 
ity (1 - p); and a safe activity which returns 1 for each 
unit of time invested.3 The risky activity has a (strictly) 
higher expected return than the safe. Payoffs generated 
by life activities are here expressed in terms of income, 
but could easily be interpreted as lifestyle quality, chil- 
dren education, health, or any other variable that matters 
for the welfare of the couple. Preferences over risk are of 
the expected utility form, with Bernoulli utility functions 
over income      ,w u w   where θ is a risk aversion 
parameter. We assume that utility is monotonically in- 
creasing and strictly concave in income. We normalise 
the Bernoulli utility function so that  , 0,u w    . 
Formally: 
Assumption 1. The risky activity has a higher ex- 
pected return than the safe: pr > 1. 
Assumption 2. Individual utilities over income  ,u w   
are such that. 
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Men and women are heterogeneous in their risk aver-
sion parameter. In particular, both women’s and men’s 
risk aversion parameter ranges between a lower bound 
  and an upper bound  , and it is uniformly distrib-
uted. The double continuum assumption guarantees that, 
for each risk aversion parameter θ, there are one man and 
one woman (and no more than one) with preferences 
represented by  ,u w  . 
Marriage is a joint venture. Man and wife both decide 
simultaneously and independently on their preferred time 
allocation over the two available activities. Any win-
nings are equally shared by the couple.4 We assume that 
the realisations of the risky activity in which man and 
wife invest are independent random draws. Under this 
assumption, expected utility of man i when wife j’s time 
share in the risky activity is jx  is equal to: 
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The marriage game is in two stages: a proposal stage 
and a married life. In the first stage, couples are formed. 
In married life, partners independently decide how to 
allocate their time across the two activities. Uncertainty 
is revealed and payoffs are distributed at the end of mar- 
ried life. 
We show that the marriage game admits a unique 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) where in the 
proposal stage agents match with partners of equal pref-
erences over risky outcomes. In married life, man and 
wife go on to invest more in the risky activity than they 
would if they were investing on their own, due to mutual 
insurance.5 
Proposition Optimal partner choice is such that i j  . 
Proof. We solve for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria 
(SPNE). Hence we proceed by backward induction. In 
the second stage agent i chooses his optimal investment 
in the risky activity   ,i jx x  , given his own risk 
aversion parameter i  and given the choice of his wife  jx  . For notational convenience denote by ix  and 
jx  man i’s and wife j’s choices respectively. For any 
given choice of wife j, jx , the optimal investment in the 
risky activity by i solves: 
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3Lotteries are here assumed to be binary only for mathematical conven-
ience. We believe that our qualitative results would go through even if 
we modelled uncertainty through non-binary variables. 
4As long as we assume homotetic preferences, the results of our model 
carry through when one considers an exogenous sharing rule (α,1-α). 
5We do not report second stage results here, but the increased riskiness 
in the individual portfolios of activities chosen by the couple follows 
from mutual insurance (see Di Cagno, Sciubba and Spallone [6]). 
Similarly, wife j takes man i’s allocation choice as 
given and solves: 
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Notice now that, for i j  , the first order conditions 
of agents i and j coincide and correspond to a global op- 
timum for player i (and j). In fact, wife j with the same 
preferences as man i chooses for herself the same portfo- 
lio of activities that man i would have chosen for his wife, 
had he been free to optimise both with respect to his own 
portfolio and with respect to his wife’s. Given that sec- 
ond period expected payoffs correspond to a global 
maximum for agent i whenever i j  , first stage 
choice falls on a partner with equal risk aversion pa- 
rameter. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
We propose a marriage model where assortative match-
ing results from elective affinities. The risky choices that 
partners make in life affect the couple’s welfare. Hence a 
good match is a match between man and wife with simi- 
lar risk preferences. There is no given level of risk aver- 
sion that is desirable per se and if we could order poten-
tial partners by their desirability, our orderings would not 
coincide, so that there is no need for us to fight for the 
same man or the same woman. Every man has his Ange-
lina Jolie. Every woman has her Brad Pitt. Surely a 
happy world. 
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